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I. INTRODUCTION
Although Virginia has established rules of liability for posses-
sors' of premises to trespassers, licensees, and invitees, 2 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has not addressed the possessor's liability
for conditions on the premises causing physical harm to public offi-
cials who are lawfully upon the premises by virtue of a privilege
and without the possessor's express permission or invitation.3
These officials include those who are authorized, but not required,
by statutes or ordinances to be upon the premises, whether or not
their employment requires it, e.g., firemen and policemen. Such of-
ficials are likely to be upon the premises at unexpected times and
* Judge, Circuit Court, City of Richmond, Division I. B.A., University of North Carolina;
LL.B., Washington & Lee University.
** Manuscripts Editor, 1982-83, University of Richmond Law Review.
1. The term "possessor" herein means the individual in control of the premises. Page
states: "'Possession' is ... a question of fact involving occupation and intent to control the
particular area where the injury occurred." J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIILrry § 1.4,
at 3 (1976). See also Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, _ 466 P.2d 545,
547-48 (1970) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 328E (1965)). The term "prem-
ises" encompasses the land and the appurtenances thereon.
2. See, e.g., Roll 'R' Way Rinks, Inc. v. Smith, 218 Va. 321, 237 S.E.2d 157 (1977) (duty
owed to invitee); Appalachian Power Co. v. LaForce, 214 Va. 438, 201 S.E.2d 768 (1974)
(duty owed to trespasser or bare licensee); Busch v. Gaglio, 207 Va. 343, 150 S.E.2d 110
(1966) (duty owed to licensee (social guest)).
3. Those public officials who are lawfully upon the premises by legal privilege, e.g.,
firemen and policemen, are hereinafter referred to as "public officials."
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under unanticipated circumstances. Not included in this article are
those public employees who are required by statutes or ordinances
to be upon the premises at particular times, e.g., building inspec-
tors or health department inspectors, and who are usually upon
the premises at anticipated times and during "normal business
hours."
The issue of liability to a fireman arose in Pearson v. Canada
Contracting Co.,4 a case of first impression in Virginia. This article
discusses the facts of Pearson and the rule of liability addressed
therein, including an exception for premises undergoing construc-
tion or demolition. Relevant law of Virginia and other jurisdictions
is explored.
This article does not address the possessor's liability when he
has violated a statute or ordinance or his liability to a casual pass-
erby of premises undergoing demolition or construction. Further-
more, the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory
negligence' are not discussed because these defenses are not af-
fected by the basic rule of possessor liability to certain public offi-
cials which is addressed in this article.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Facts of Pearson
The plaintiff, Cecil W. Pearson, was a fireman employed by the
Richmond Bureau of Fire at the time of the injury giving rise to
this case. The injury occurred on June 25, 1979, in an industrial
building on Brown's Island in Richmond. The building was one of
several being demolished, and fires had occurred previously in the
other buildings undergoing demolition. There were three defen-
dants in the action: Ethyl Corporation, the owner of the premises;
Canada Contracting Company, the general contractor for the dem-
olition project; and C. S. Lewis, a subcontractor removing and sal-
vaging metal on the premises.'
The Richmond Bureau of Fire had extinguished fires previously
4. LE-608 (Cir. Ct., City of Richmond, Div. I filed Apr. 15, 1981).
5. See, e.g., Amusement Slides Corp. v. Lehmann, 217 Va. 815, 232 S.E.2d 803 (1977)
(assumption of risk); Smith v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 204 Va. 128, 129 S.E.2d 655
(1963) (contributory negligence).
6. Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., LE-608 (Cir. Ct., City of Richmond, Div. I filed
Apr. 15, 1981). Ethyl Corporation subsequently was dismissed from the action pursuant to a
settlement and covenant not to sue. Id.
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at the site. In fact, Pearson had participated in fighting a fire in
another part of the premises on May 14, 1979, approximately five
weeks prior to his injury. He also had knowledge that the building
in which he was injured was undergoing demolition at the time of
his injury.'
The room in which Pearson was injured contained a "broke
hole" which had been surrounded by a guard rail.8 On the date of
the injury, although a number of hours earlier, Lewis had removed
a portion of the roof over the room where the injury occurred.
Some of the resulting rubble partially or completely covered the
broke hole. This part of the premises was "not held open to the
public.""
The June 25 fire occurred at night. In the process of entering the
premises to extinguish the fire, Pearson "fell through the broke
hole to the basement of the building,"' 0 a distance of five feet. He
sustained injuries to his back and spinal cord as a result of the
fall.11
Due to the alleged negligence on the part of the defendants re-
sulting in his injuries, Pearson sued the defendants jointly and sev-
erally for $2,000,000 in damages. These damages included "medical
expenses, lost time for work, for past, present and future rehabili-
tation; pain and suffering caused by the defendant. '12
B. Virginia Precedent-Liability to Firemen
In Chesapeake & Ohio Railway v. Crouch,13 the Supreme Court
of Virginia addressed a possessor's liability to firemen in the con-
text of injuries resulting from a fire which the possessor negligently
caused.1' The defendant railroad was allegedly negligent in causing
a fire on its right-of-way, and the fire spread to adjacent prop-
7. Id.
8. The broke hole had been present when the plant was operating so as to allow trash
from the manufacturing process to fall into the basement. The stipulation of facts, for pur-
poses of defendant's motion for summary judgment only, did not indicate whether the guard
rail had been removed at the time of the incident. However, the plaintiff's amended motion
for judgment alleged that it had been removed. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Although Pearson alleged the distance of the fall to be twenty feet, the stipulation
of facts indicated it to be five feet. Id.
12. Id.
13. 208 Va. 602, 159 S.E.2d 650, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968).
14. Id.
19831
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erty.1' The plaintiff's decedent, who had experience in fighting
fires, had volunteered to help the forest warden fight the spreading
fire. Furthermore, he knew he would be paid to do so, although the
pay was minimal.1"
The fire spread to a wooded area where winds enkindled the fire
as the fireman attempted to extinguish it. A fireman was burned
severely and died about six weeks later.17 The decedent's adminis-
tratrix brought a wrongful death action against the defendant rail-
road. The trial court entered final judgment on the jury's verdict
for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.' 8
Since Crouch was a case of first impression, the court considered
the general rule regarding the liability of a possessor whose negli-
gence causes a fire resulting in injuries to a fireman attempting to
extinguish it. 9 The court noted that it was almost universally the
rule that no liability to firemen is imposed upon those who negli-
gently cause fires. 20 Furthermore, the situations in which liability
had been imposed had involved risks which were not inherent in
the undertaking.21 The court stated that such risks include "undue
risks of injury, such as hidden, unknown, and increased dangers,
the hazard of which a fireman does not ordinarily assume. '22
The court found that the hazards which resulted in the dece-
dent's injuries were inherent in fighting fires and thus applied the
general rule of nonliability on the part of the defendant railroad.28
15. 208 Va. at 602, 159 S.E.2d at 651.
16. Id. at 603, 605-06, 159 S.E.2d at 651, 653.
17. Id. at 603-04, 159 S.E.2d at 651.
18. Id. at 602-03, 159 S.E.2d at 651.
19. Id. at 606-09, 159 S.E.2d at 653-55. After considering a statute empowering the war-
den to summon "able-bodied male persons between eighteen and fifty years of age . . . to
assist in extinguishing any forest fire," id. at 605, 159 S.E.2d at 652 (quoting VA. CoDE ANN.
§ 10-59), the court declined to apply the statute to this case because it found that the
decedent fireman had voluntarily fought the fire free of statutory compulsion and that he
had served in the capacity of a paid fireman. 208 Va. at 605-06, 159 S.E.2d at 653.
20. 208 Va. at 606, 159 S.E.2d at 653. See also Mueller, Liability to the Public Ser-
vant-A Divided Approach to Duty, 68 ILL. B.J. 333, 335-36 (1980); Note, Landowner's
Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter of Right or Under a Privilege of
Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. Rav. 407, 419 & n.56 (1966) (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31
N.J. 270, 274, 157 A.2d 129, 131 (1960)) [hereinafter cited as Negligence Liability].
21. 208 Va. at 607, 159 S.E.2d at 653-54 (citing Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, _, 157 A.2d
129, 131, and quoting Jackson v. Velveray Corp., 82 N.J. Super. 469, , 198 A.2d 115, 121
(1964)).
22. 208 Va. at 607, 159 S.E.2d at 653 (noting that fault was usually premised on "creating
undue risks of injury, that is, risks beyond those inevitably involved in firefighting").
23. Id. at 609, 159 S.E.2d at 655 (reversing the trial court's judgment, setting aside the
verdict for the plaintiff, and entering final judgment for the defendant).
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The court then held that "as a matter of law, . . the deceased
assumed the risk . . . [of fighting the fire]. 24
In making its decision, the Virginia Supreme Court discussed va-
rious rationales underlying the general rule of nonliability. Some
courts find that the possessor owes no duty to a fireman to avoid
negligently causing a fire since "it is [the fireman's business] to
deal with the hazards of fire, whether or not negligently set, any
such negligence being immaterial."2 5
The second rationale posited and ultimately adopted by the
court was assumption of the risks inherent in fighting fires. 26 The
court gave the following explanation for this doctrine:
The assumption of risk doctrine employed in fire cases does not
depend upon the existence of a spirit of venturesomeness in the face
of known danger, as is true in automobile negligence cases, but
rather upon the relationship betwen the fireman and the public,
from which arises his obligation to accept the usual risks of injury in
undertaking to suppress fires without regard to whether or not they
are caused by negligence."
The court premised its holding of nonliability on assumption of
the risk, expressing the view that the imposition of liability for
negligently causing fires or for injuries resulting from the inherent
risks of fighting such fires would be an undue burden to put on the
possessor who is powerless to prohibit the fireman's involvement or
to control his acts."'
In addition to establishing a rule of nonliability for negligent
causation of fires in which a fire fighter is injured by inherent risks,
the Virginia Supreme Court also declared that firemen constitute a
category of sui generis plaintiffs. The court made this declaration
in a summary fashion without discussing what a possessor's duty
or liability should be to a sui generis individual.29
24. Id.
25. Id. at 607, 159 S.E.2d at 654 (noting this to be the reasoning in Krauth v. Geller, 31
N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960)).
26. 208 Va. at 607-09, 159 S.E.2d at 654-55.
27. Id. at 608, 159 S.E.2d at 654.
28. Id. at 608-09, 159 S.E.2d at 655 (quoting Wax v. Co-operative Refinery Ass'n, 154
Neb. 805, -, 49 N.W.2d 707, 710 (1951), which quoted Suttie v. Sun Oil & Co., 15 Pa. D. &
C. 3 (1930)).
29. 208 Va. at 608, 159 S.E.2d at 654-55 (basing this classification on "the public nature
of his rights and duties"). The court did not expressly label firemen sui generis, but did so
impliedly. Id.
1983] 471
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The supreme court has not subsequently addressed the liability
of the possessor to individuals falling within this sui generis cate-
gory. Nor has it addressed whether the general rule of nonliability
and the sui generis classification apply to policemen. Because the
policy considerations involved appear to be virtually identical in
the case of policemen, the same general rule of nonliability should
apply.30
III. THE LAWS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS REGARDING A
POSSESSOR'S LIABILITY TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS
A. General Philosophical and Policy Considerations
Various reasons have been given for limiting the liability of pos-
sessors to firemen and policemen. It has been argued that these
employees receive adequate compensation, including workmen's
compensation and disability pension benefits. 1 However, the ques-
tion has been raised regarding the adequacy of a fireman's com-
pensation in light of the increased risk of injury. 2 The same ques-
tion is equally applicable to the policeman.
The doctrine of assumption of the risk has been posited as a
further reason for denying liability. As applied to public officials,
this doctrine is not based on the ordinary ground of the plaintiff's
venturesomeness in confronting a known danger. It instead is
based on the public official's relationship with the public, which
results in "his obligation to accept the usual risks of injury in un-
dertaking to suppress fires. . . ."" Furthermore, the assumption
tends to be limited to those risks which are inherent in the situa-
30. See infra text accompanying notes 122-35.
31. Comment, The New Minnesota Fireman's Rule-An Application of the Assumption
of Risk Doctrine: Armstrong v. Mailand, 64 MINN. L. REv. 878, 887 (1980) (citing Walters v.
Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 205-07, 571 P.2d 609, 612-14, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152, 155-57 (1977) and
MINN. STAT. §§ 69.41, .45 (1978), 176.011 to .82 (1978 & Supp. 1979), 424.19 to .20 (1978))
[hereinafter cited as New Minnesota Rule].
32. New Minnesota Rule, supra note 31, at 887-88.
33. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 608, 159 S.E.2d 650, 654 (1968) (recovery
for wrongful death from inherent risk of fighting fires barred by assumption of inherent
risks). See supra text accompanying notes 13-28.
This doctrine has been criticized by one author who noted that since assumption of the
risk must be made voluntarily and intelligently, there is not a true assumption in the case of
the public official because of the lack of voluntariness in undertaking the specific task. If an
individual chooses to be a fireman, he must face those risks inherent in extinguishing fires.
Otherwise, he must forego employment as a fire fighter. New Minnesota Rule, supra note
31, at 885-86. But see supra text accompanying notes 26-28, 33.
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tion, and not undue, unexpected ones.3
In determining liability of the possessor to public officials, courts
have frequently attempted to balance the rights and burdens of
possessors with those of public officials. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey stated in Krauth v. Geller:35 "[L]iability is not always
coextensive with foreseeability of harm. The question is ultimately
one of public policy and the answer must be distilled from the rele-
vant factors involved upon an inquiry into what is fair and just.""6
In addressing the duty of an owner to warn of a hidden hazard,
known to him, if he is present at the scene, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co. 37 balanced
the burden on the owner in that situation with the burden on the
public official who would suffer the consequences of the possessor's
failure to warn. Finding that the burden on the public official out-
weighed the burden on the possessor, the court imposed a duty to
warn on the possessor. 8
Although consideration of the relative burdens has influenced
courts in determining the liability of possessors to public officials,
ultimately courts seem to determine liability on the basis of the
public official's classification while on the premises.
B. Effect of Classification of Entrant
Traditionally, the common law duties of the possessor of prem-
ises to the entrant depended upon the entrant's "legally defined
status upon entering the land."3'9 The possessor's duties included:
34. See, e.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods., Co., 232 Minn. 394, _, 45 N.W.2d 549,
553 (1951), overruled, Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349 (Minn. 1979) (citing Pe-
terson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972) for abolition of licensee and invitee
classifications); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, -, 157 A.2d 129, 130-31 (1960); Spencer v.
B.P. John Furniture Corp., 255 Or. 359, _, 467 P.2d 429, 432 (1970); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 607, 159 S.E.2d 650, 653-54 (1968); Mueller, supra note 20, at 337
(quoting Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 II. 2d 103, 109, 361 N.E.2d 282, 287
(1976)); Negligence Liability, supra note 20, at 416 n.43, 420.
Regarding the undue risks, "firemen and policemen should not be penalized because of
their occupations, neither should all the people [i.e., the public] be expected to bear the
burden created by the negligent acts or omissions of a few." Negligence Liability, supra
note 20, at 426.
35. 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960). See infra text accompanying notes 83-87.
36. Id. at -, 157 A.2d at 130.
37. 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951).
38. Id. at., 45 N.W.2d at 553. See infra text accompanying notes 100-06 for discussion of
Shypulski.
39. Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation
of Judge and Jury Functions, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 15, 16.
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(1) a duty of reasonable care to the business invitee, (2) a duty to
warn about "known hidden dangers and. .. [protection] against
injury from willful and wanton acts or. . . active negligence"40 to
the licensee, and (3) a duty to refrain from the infliction of inten-
tional injury to the trespasser.4'
The individual who enters premises by virtue of a legal privilege
irrespective of the possessor's consent or invitation has posed
problems for courts in establishing the liability of the possesssor42
for conditions unrelated to the public official's purpose and func-
tion on the premises. The traditional categories of entrants are not
really appropriate for this entrant because his entrance is (1) law-
ful, negating trespasser status; (2) premised on a legal privilege,
irrespective of consent or invitation, negating licensee or invitee
status; and (3) primarily for a public purpose and benefit, thus ne-
gating invitee status.3 Courts have dealt with this problem in a
variety of ways. Some have granted the public official the common
law status of licensee or invitee, others have classified the official
as sui generis, and still others have imposed upon the possessor a
duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.44
1. Licensee
Firemen and policemen are classified as licensees in the majority
of jurisdictions.45 Believing the duty owed to invitees to be too
great a burden to place on possessors "since firemen and policemen
40. Id.
41. Id. at 15-16.
42. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 61, at 395-96 (4th ed. 1971).
43. See PAGE, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 99; Note, Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's
Rule, 7 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV. 749, 752-53 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Assumption of Risk].
See also PROSSER, supra note 42, § 61, at 396.
44. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973) (distinction between
licensee and invitee abolished; duty of reasonable care under the circumstances); Nared v.
School Dist., 191 Neb. 376, -, 215 N.W.2d 115, 118 (1974) (policeman treated as licensee
when injured on part of "premises not held open to the public"); Beedenbender v. Midtown
Properties, Inc., 4 A.D.2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1957) (policeman considered sui generis);
Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, -, 466 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1970) (fireman
considered invitee under "economic benefit" test).
45. PAGE, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 100, § 5.9, at 107. See, e.g., Whitten v. Miami-Dade
Water & Sewer Auth., 357 So. 2d 430, 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (policemen and firemen),
cert. denied, 364 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1978); Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, _
384 A.2d 76, 79-81 (1978) (policeman); Anderson v. Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, -, 282 S.W.2d
445, 446-47 (1955) (fireman), overruled on other grounds, Wells v. Goforth, 443 S.W.2d 155
(Mo. 1969) (duty to licensees increased); Scheurer v. Trustees of Open Bible Church, 175
Ohio St. 163, -, 192 N.E.2d 38, 41-43 (1963) (policeman). See also Assumption of Risk,
supra note 43, at 752.
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may appear at unexpected times and on unexpected parts of the
premises, 46 these courts have classified the fireman and policeman
as licensees.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts treats the public official as a
licensee with corresponding liability imposed on the possessor.
However, the public official is considered an invitee if his injury
results from a condition on the premises open to the public. 47 The
general rule of liability is:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition
and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to
such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or real-
ize the danger, and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe,
or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condi-
tion and the risk involved.48
According to the Washington Court of Appeals in Strong v. Se-
attle Stevedore Co.,49 the possessor's only duty to the licensee is to
refrain from inflicting willful or wanton injury. However, the court
acknowledged that
[liability has been imposed (1) where means of public access have
not been maintained in a reasonably safe condition, (2) where there
has been a failure to warn of unusual or hidden hazards, (3) where
there is a breach or violation of a statutory duty, and (4) where
there is active negligence."
46. PAGE, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 100 (noting criticism directed at this rationale). See also
Negligence Liability, supra note 20, at 408.
47. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 345 (1965). Subsection (1) provides:
Except as stated in Subsection (2) [public employee considered invitee if injury
occurs "because of a condition of a part of the land held open to the public," Id. §
345(2)], the liability of a possessor of land to one who enters the land only in the
exercise of a privilege, for. . . a public. . . purpose, and irrespective of the posses-
sor's consent, is the same as the liability to a licensee.
Id. § 345(1).
48. Id. § 342 (emphasis added).
49. 1 Wash. App. 898, 466 P.2d 545 (1970) (classifying fireman as invitee under facts, but
denying recovery because of decedent fireman's superior knowledge of specific hazard).
50. Id. at -, 466 P.2d at 548 (dictum) (citations omitted). See also PAGE, supra note 1, §
5.2, at 100, § 5.9, at 107.
1983]
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The liability of the possessor to the licensee-public official is
very restricted unless one of the aforementioned exceptions applies
to the facts of the case. Even the duty to warn is limited by the
possessor's knowledge of the concealed danger and the opportunity
to so warn. 1
2. Invitee
A few jurisdictions consider public officials to be invitees under
all circumstances or while in those areas of the premises open to
the public.5 2 Other jurisdictions classify the public official as an in-
vitee on the basis of his function at the time of the injury and the
intended beneficiary of this function, i.e., the possessor instead of
the public.5 Thus, the possessor owes this invitee-public official
the duty of reasonable care.5 4 Such reasonable care encompasses
keeping the premises in a safe condition to avoid exposing the en-
trant to unnecessary hazards and warning the entrant of hidden
dangers of which the possessor has notice. The basis for this duty
of reasonable care is that the entrant "has a right to assume that
the premises, aside from obvious dangers, [are] . . . reasonably
safe for the purpose for which he [is] . ..upon them, and that
proper precaution [has] . ..been taken to make them so.''5"
3. Abandonment of Categories of Entrants
A few jurisdictions have abandoned common law categories as a
means for determining the liability of possessors to any entrant,
including firemen and policemen.56 In Mounsey v. Ellard,57 the Su-
51. See, e.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, -, 45 N.W.2d 549,
552-53 (1951); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, -, 157 A.2d 129, 131-32 (1960); Beedenbender
v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 A.D.2d 276, -, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276, 281 (1957); Schwab v. Rubel
Corp., 286 N.Y. 525, -, 37 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1941); PAGE, supra note 1, § 5.2, at 100, § 5.9, at
107; Negligence Liability, supra note 20, at 411.
52. PAGE, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 100-01. See also Taylor v. Palmetto Theater Co., 204 S.C.
1, -, 28 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1943); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 345(2) (1965).
53. See, e.g., Cameron v. Abatiell, 127 Vt. 111, -, 241 A.2d 310, 313-15 (1968) (policeman
as invitee under facts of case); Strong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 1 Wash. App. 898, -, 466
P.2d 545, 548-49 (1970) (fireman as invitee under "economic benefit" test); PROSSER, supra
note 42, § 61, at 396.
54. Strong, 1 Wash. App. at -, 466 P.2d at 548.
55. Morgan v. Renehan-Akers Co., 126 Vt. 494, -, 236 A.2d 645, 647 (1967), cited with
approval in Cameron v. Abatiell, 127 Vt. 111, -, 241 A.2d 310, 315 (1968).
56. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, -, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51-53 (1973) (noting
effect of abolition of licensee-invitee classifications and treating policeman accordingly);
Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349 (Minn. 1979) (prior abolition of licensee-invitee
classification encompassed sui generis classification of fireman).
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preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed the historical un-
derpinnings of the traditional approach of imposing liability on the
possessor based on the classification of the entrant into the com-
mon law category of licensee or invitee, and rejected its appropri-
ateness in an urban society. The court then stated that as regards
any entrant lawfully upon the premises, the possessor must "'act
as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a reasonably
safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likeli-
hood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the bur-
den of avoiding the risk.' ,,58 In Mounsey, a policeman was injured
while on official business and sued the possessors. The trial court
ordered a directed verdict for the defendants. The supreme judicial
court reversed the trial court's ruling and ordered a new trial for
the jury's determination according to the new standard.59
Although firemen had been declared to be sui generis in Shypul-
ski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co.,60 the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota extended its abandonment of the traditional classification ap-
proach to include those falling within the former sui generis
category in Armstrong v. Mailand.e1 Using this modern approach,
the court defined the duty owed to firemen in Minnesota as
follows:
[L]andowners owe firemen a duty of reasonable care, except to the
extent firemen primarily assume the risk when entering upon the
land. Firemen assume, in a primary sense, all risks reasonably ap-
parent to them that are part of firefighting. However, they do not
assume, in a primary sense, risks that are hidden from or unantici-
pated by the firemen. 2
The Armstrong court applied primary assumption of the risk to
bar recovery by plaintiffs in a wrongful death action brought after
57. 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973).
58. Id. at -, 297 N.E.2d at 52 (quoting Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469 F.2d 97, 100
(D.C. Cir. 1972)).
59. 363 Mass. at -, 297 N.E.2d at 44, 53-54.
60. 232 Minn. 394, -, 45 N.W.2d 549, 550 (1951). See infra text accompanying notes 100-
06.
61. 284 N.W.2d 343, 349 (Minn. 1979) (noting duty to sui generis entrant to have been
"somewhere between licensee and invitee").
62. Id. at 350. The court distinguished primary and secondary assumption of the risk,
with primary assumption being the absence of any duty of care owed by the possessor and
thus not an affirmative defense. Id. at 348. This article does not utilize this distinction.
Rather, assumption of the risk is utilized in its traditional sense and as modified by the
Virginia Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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firemen died fighting a fire involving liquified petroleum. The spe-
cific hazard causing death was a boiling liquid expanding vapor ex-
plosion, a hazard of which the decedents were aware. 3
The Court of Appeals of New York addressed the elements of
unusual risk and duty to warn, without giving firemen any specific
status in Schwab v. Rubel Corp.6 4 In Schwab, a fire broke out in a
building which had housed an ice factory and from which the ma-
chinery, equipment, and scrap metal were being removed. The first
floor, where the fire started, had holes which were used to drop
disassembled equipment to the ground floor. The plaintiff fireman
was injured when he fell through one of the openings where a piece
of equipment had been located. The facts were conflicting regard-
ing whether the opening was unguarded and whether the fireman
was given a warning concerning the hazard. The court reversed the
trial court's judgment for the defendants and ordered a new trial
for the jury to consider whether an unusual danger was present,
whether the defendant or his agent had knowledge of this danger,
and if so, whether the defendant or his agents gave a warning. e5
Apparently the plaintiff had had no prior experience with the
premises to provide him with knowledge of the potential hazards.
4. The Sui Generis Category
Since firemen and policemen do not fit the criteria for the tradi-
tional common law categories of entrants,6 6 some courts have de-
clared them to fall within a category that is sui generis.67 Despite
the uniqueness connoted by the term "sui generis," Page, an au-
thority on premises liability, has noted that in reality the duty
owed by the possessor to individuals falling within the sui generis
category does not exceed the duty owed to licensees.68
63. Id. at 345-47, 353. See also Griffiths v. Lovelette Transfer Co., 313 N.W.2d 602 (Minn.
1981) (primary assumption or risk applied to policeman).
64. 286 N.Y. 525, 37 N.E.2d 234 (1941).
65. Id. at -, 37 N.E.2d at 235-36.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
67. See, e.g., Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, -, 45 N.W.2d 549,
550 (1951) (firemen); Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc., 4 A.D.2d 276, -, 164
N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (1957) (policeman); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 608, 159
S.E.2d 650, 655 (1968) (firemen); PAGE, supra note 1, § 5.2, at 101.
68. PAGE, supra note 1, § 5.2, at 101. See also Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349
(Minn. 1979) (noting duty of care owed to sui generis under Shypulski to be "somewhere
between licensee and invitee").
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In Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 9 the New York Court of Ap-
peals impliedly classified the plaintiff fireman as sui generis by" ac-
knowledging that his presence was rightful and by rejecting the
classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee. The court then
addressed the duty owed to this group in relation to the condition
of the route of access to the premises.
70
In Meiers, the fireman was injured when he fell into an un-
guarded hole in the driveway giving access to a stable which was on
fire. The driveway was dark at the time, but the defendant con-
tended that the fire had caused the failure of the electric lights
which would have illuminated the driveway. The trial court dis-
missed the action by a directed verdict, but the appellate division
reversed. 71
The court of appeals affirmed the reversal and entered a judg-
ment for the plaintiff. It held that recovery was appropriate for the
nonlicensee, rightfully entering the business premises, who is in-
jured by the landowner's negligent failure "to keep that way
[means of access] in a reasonably safe condition for those using it
as it was intended to be used."72
In Beedenbender v. Midtown Properties, Inc.,7 3 the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court expressly classified
firemen and policemen as "sui generis, privileged to enter the land
for a public purpose irrespective of consent."'74 In Beedenbender,
the night watchman of a restaurant summoned a policeman be-
cause of a prowler. During the investigation of the back of the
premises, the policeman climbed a fence separating the restaurant
property from the adjacent property. There was a narrow sidewalk
along with an eighteen-inch ledge on the other side and then a
drop of approximately eighteen to twenty feet. The policeman lost
his balance, fell, and was injured. Although the night watchman
was present, he did not warn the policeman of the drop. The po-
liceman subsequently brought a negligence action against the own-
ers of both properties.75
69. 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
70. Id. at -, 127 N.E. at 491-93.
71. Id. at _, 127 N.E. at 491, 493.
72. Id. at _, 127 N.E. at 493. The court was influenced by the fact that there had been
previous fires in the barn, thus putting the owner on notice of the possibility of the fire-
man's presence on the premises after business hours. Id.
73. 4 A.D.2d 276, 164 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1957).
74. Id. at _, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 280.
75. Id. at _, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 277-78.
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The appellate division elaborated on the dual duties of landown-
ers to policemen and firemen, the first of which concerned the con-
dition of the access route to the premises."6
[I]f the owner knows of the presence on the premises of officially
privileged persons, such as firemen or policemen, is cognizant of a
dangerous condition thereon, and has reason to believe that they are
unaware of the danger, he has a duty to warn them of the condition
and the risk involved .... The owner owes no duty to those privi-
leged to enter irrespective of consent to safeguard those parts of his
property not ordinarily utilized for passage through the premises, or
to discover potential dangers therein, for the entry thereon by such
persons under unusual conditions at any hour of the day or night is
not reasonably foreseeable. 77
The court found that the defendants had no duty regarding the
fence because it was not a usual means of access. It further held
that the existence of any duty to warn was a question of fact and
thus did not exist as a matter of law. To determine that such a
duty existed, the jury would have to find that the "drop" was an
unusual hazard and that the night watchman, serving in an agency
role, had knowledge of the danger, as well as grounds to think that
the policeman would not otherwise discover it. Because of errors in
the trial excluding evidence relevant to these questions, a new trial
was ordered, and a judgment against the restaurant owner was
reversed.78
The appellate division reaffirmed the sui generis classification
and the Beedenbender duties in extending them to lessees and oc-
cupants in McGee v. Adams Paper & Twine Co.7 9 McGee was a
wrongful death action brought after the deaths of firemen and fire
underwriter patrolmen when a six-story building, the upper four
floors of which were used mainly for storing commercial paper, col-
lapsed in a fire.80 Although the plaintiffs alleged that the fifth floor
was overloaded, even before the paper became soaked from the fire
fighting efforts, the court found that the only duty owed by the
defendants would be a duty to warn. However, because the court
76. Id. at -, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. Id.
79. 26 A.D.2d 186, -, 271 N.Y.S.2d 698, 707 (1966), aff'd mem., 20 N.Y.2d 921, 233
N.E.2d 289, 286 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1967).
80. 26 A.D.2d at -, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
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considered building collapse to be a risk generally inherent in fire
fighting, it held that no duty was owed by the defendants.8' Thus,
the court reversed and vacated a judgment for the plaintiffs.8 2
New Jersey also has classified firemen as sui generis and defined
the duties of possessors accordingly. In Krauth v. Geller,'" a fire-
man was injured at a house under construction which contained an
overheated salamander used to dry the walls. At the time of the
injury there was not yet a railing around the balcony or stairwell.
However, the fireman was aware of the stage of construction be-
cause he had answered an alarm to the house four days prior to the
accident and admitted at trial that he had this knowledge. Despite
this knowledge, the fireman accidentally fell from the balcony,
which, because of smoke layers, had the appearance of stairs. 4 In
affirming the reversal of a judgment for the fireman, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey found that the landowner-builder was not lia-
ble for either the condition of the premises under the circum-
stances of construction or for a failure to warn since the defendant
was not present.85
In exploring the issue of when a landowner or occupier should be
liable to a fireman, the court in Krauth stated that liability must
be determined by public policy considerations premised on fairness
and justice under the circumstances.8" Although not applicable to
the Krauth facts, the court noted that conditions under which lia-
bility may be imposed for undue risks not inherent in firefighting
would include: statutory violations causing the risk, e.g., un-
guarded elevator shafts; failure to warn of hidden dangers when
the opportunity to warn was present; and lack of due care regard-
ing the condition of routes of access to the premises by anticipated
users.
8 7
81. Id. at _, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 707-08.
82. Id. at _, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 698-99, 713. Although New York has abolished classifications
of entrants on premises, the courts have not addressed whether the Beedenbender duties
are still applicable to firemen and policemen in light of this new standard. Fiederlein v.
Hochberg Bros., 83 A.D.2d 472, -, 445 N.Y.S.2d 183, 186-87 (1981) (duty of reasonable care
applied to telephone repairman) (citing Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976) and Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387
N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976) for the abolition of classifications).
83. 31 N.J. 270, -, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960).
84. Id. at _, 157 A.2d at 131-32.
85. Id. at -, 157 A.2d at 130-33.
86. Id. at -, 157 A.2d at 130.
87. Id. at _, 157 A.2d at 131.
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In Jackson v. Velveray Corp.,8  the Superior Court of New
Jersey defined the noninherent risks noted in Krauth89 as follows:
"Undue risk beyond these inherent hazards ... includes hidden
perils, such as an open elevator shaft, storage of dangerous sub-
stances, and other conditions independent of the fire itself."90 The
court further stated:
The law . . . [the undue risk doctrine] is not concerned with how
the fire began or spread before the firemen arrived, but rather
whether, after they arrived and undertook to fight the fire, they
were subjected to risks not inevitable or inherent in fighting the fire
of that kind and extent.9 '
The Supreme Court of Oregon impliedly classified firemen as sui
generis in Spencer v. B.P. John Furniture Corp.,92 a wrongful
death action brought by the administratrix of the estate of a fire-
man who had died fighting a fire allegedly caused by the defend-
ant's negligence in permitting dust to accumulate. The accumula-
tion of dust exploded when the fire hit it, and the fireman was
killed. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling sus-
taining the defendant's demurrer, but granted the plaintiff leave to
file another amended complaint subject to the trial court's
permission.9
In Spencer, the supreme court explained the basis for its ruling
as follows:
[A] fireman does not assume all risks encountered in fighting fires.
He should have a right to expect that the owner or possessor of a
premises will not imprudently permit an unusual, serious hidden
danger of a totally unexpected kind and, therefore, we hold that he
does not assume such risks .... A measure of protection resulting
from training and experience can be taken against apparent, kimwn,
or to-be-anticipated risks. However, a fireman is completely vulnera-
ble to such a hidden danger.... and we see nothing in the lack-of-
duty concept of assumption of risk or in public policy which pre-
cludes him from having a cause of action in such circumstances.
88. 82 N.J. Super. 469, 198 A.2d 115 (1964).
89. See supra text accompanying note 87.
90. 82 N.J. Super. at -, 198 A.2d at 118-19.
91. Id. at -, 198 A.2d at 121.
92. 255 Or. 359, -, 467 P.2d 429, 430 (1970).
93. Id. at _, 467 P.2d at 430, 433.
94. Id. at _, 467 P.2d at 432 (citations omitted).
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According to the court, the existence of "undue risks" is, in part, a
function of the use to which the premises are placed.95
In Buren v. Midwest Industries,"8 the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the denial of recovery in an action brought for the
death of a fireman killed while fighting a fire which was alleged to
have spread more rapidly because of various violations of fire
safety statutes, e.g., requirements of fire walls. After classifying the
fireman as sui generis, the court applied the principle of assump-
tion of those risks inherent in fire fighting. The court based its ap-
plication of this principle to deny recovery upon the fireman's
training in evaluating dangers and upon the lack of possessor con-
trol once the fireman enters the scene. Nonetheless, the court
agreed with the principle that "a fireman is entitled to assume
compliance with respect to unguarded elevator shafts, open stair-
wells, exposed wires, and similar hazards to a reasonably safe ac-
cess to and use of the premises in the manner in which they are
ordinarily expected to be used ... ."'s The court, however, found
that the safety violations which allowed the fire to spread more
rapidly did not fit within those hazards inherent in fire fighting.99
In Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co.,100 the Supreme
Court of Minnesota, after classifying a fireman as sui generis, held
that when a possessor knows of the existence of a hidden peril and
has the opportunity to warn a fireman of it, he has a duty to do
so.101 The court stated, however, that "firemen must accept the
premises as they find them . ..."101 The rationale for this view
was two-fold: (1) it would be an undue burden to require a land-
owner to exercise reasonable care regarding the condition of the
entire premises, including those areas not routinely used, and (2) if
such a requirement were imposed, a landowner might delay calling
the fire department and attempt to extinguish the fire himself. If
his efforts were unsuccessful, reasoned the court, the danger to the
95. Id. at -, 467 P.2d at 432.
96. 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964).
97. Id. at 99 ("having bound ... [the possessor's] hands [by denying control over fire-
man], the law cannot justly inflict upon him the consequences of what he might otherwise
have been able to prevent").
98. Id. at 98.
99. Id. at 98-99.
100. 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951). See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text
for discussion of Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979), which overruled
Shypulski.
101. 232 Minn. at , 45 N.W.2d at 549-50, 552-53.
102. Id. at -, 45 N.W.2d at 551.
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public would be even greater."' 3
The Shypulski court affirmed the overruling of a demurrer in a
negligence action based on injuries sustained by a fireman when an
inadequately constructed wall collapsed from the lateral pressure
exerted during the fire fighting. Employees of the defendant were
present at the time and failed to warn the fireman.104 The court
expressed the view that although assumption of risks inherent in
fire fighting was appropriate, firemen "should [not] be required to
assume the extraordinary risk of hidden perils of which they might
easily be warned." 105 The court balanced the burden on the land-
owner in giving warning while present against the costs of failure
to warn.l°6
Those courts classifying firemen and policemen as sui generis
have defined liability to a public official on the premises by virtue
of legal privilege on the basis of risks which the fireman reasonably
should have anticipated because of his training, experience, and
knowledge of the use of or changes occurring on the premises.
Where a duty to warn was found to exist, the defendant or his
agent was present at the fire.
IV. A RULE FOR VIRGINIA
In developing a rule for Virginia for a possessor's liability to
public officials, several cases are particularly instructive. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia addressed the duty of a possessor of land
to a social guest licensee in Busch v. Gaglio.10 7 In Busch, a visitor
was injured by a metal stake protruding above the ground near the
driveway and sidewalk of the host's house.108 In determining the
appropriate rule of liability, the court quoted section 342 of The
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 09 The court's holding for the
103. Id.
104. Id. at -, 45 N.W.2d at 550, 554.
105. Id. at _, 45 N.W.2d at 553.
106. Id.
107. 207 Va. 343, 150 S.E.2d 110 (1966).
108. Id. at 344-46, 150 S.E.2d at 111. The defendant owner was found to control the
premises although his mother and sisters actually lived there. He had driven the stake into
the ground so that cars could not be parked in the yard. The plaintiff was a friend of the
mother and sisters and arrived after dark on the evening that she was injured. The stake
was in an unlighted area. Id. at 344-45, 150 S.E.2d at 111.
109. Id. at 347, 150 S.E.2d at 113 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 342
(1965)). See supra text accompanying note 48.
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plaintiff ° closely tracked the language of this section:
[Tihe defendant was liable to the plaintiff for injuries caused her by
the condition on his land if he knew or had reason to know of the
condition, should have realized that it involved an unreasonable risk
of harm to her, should have expected that she would not discover or
realize the danger, and failed to exercise reasonable care to make the
condition safe or to warn her of the condition; provided, however,
that she did not know or have reason to know of the condition and
the risk involved."'
In Indian Acres v. Denion,11 2 the Virginia Supreme Court ad-
dressed the duty of an owner to a business invitee in the context of
premises undergoing construction where excess construction
materials were readily accessible to a lawful entrant on the prem-
ises. 1 3 Although injuries to the entrant were produced by the ac-
tion of a third party and were not foreseeable by the defendant,
the court also indicated that its refusal to impose liability upon the
owner was based upon the principle that "the developer was not
required to eliminate all excess construction materials from the
site, while construction was still in progress."" 4
Material factual differences distinguish the holdings in Pearson
and Indian Acres. For example, in Pearson it was alleged that haz-
ardous or defective conditions existed on the premises, whereas in
Indian Acres there were no such allegations. The premises in-
110. 207 Va. at 348-49, 150 S.E.2d at 114. The court reversed the trial court which had set
aside the jury verdict for the plaintiff, reinstated the verdict, and entered final judgment for
the plaintiff. Id. at 345, 349-50, 150 S.E.2d at 111, 115.
111. Id. at 348-49, 150 S.E.2d at 114 (emphasis added).
112. 215 Va. 847, 213 S.E.2d 797 (1975).
113. Id. (assuming without deciding that plaintiff was invitee).
In Indian Acres an observation tower was being made from an old silo on a camping
community which was being developed. As the tower conversion was almost finished, lawful
entrants had ready access to it. There was construction debris in the area surrounding the
tower. The adolescent son of one of the users of the camp site climbed the tower and
dropped a piece of concrete, between the size of a softball and a volleyball, from the top.
The concrete struck the adolescent plaintiff in the face. Suit was brought for negligence. 215
Va. at 847-49, 213 S.E.2d at 798.
No methods to control the use of the tower had been employed by the defendant. How-
ever, the defendant had no notice that objects had been thrown previously from the tower.
Id. at 848-49, 213 S.E.2d at 798. The court agreed with the defendant that the adolescent's
action in dropping the concrete was "not foreseeable, by a reasonable person exercising ordi-
nary care for the safety of others. . . ." Id. at 849, 213 S.E.2d at 799. The court thus deter-
mined that there was no primary negligence and found no liability on the part of the owner
defendant. Id. at 851, 213 S.E.2d at 800.
114. Id. at 850, 213 S.E.2d at 799.
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volved in Pearson were restricted, unlike those in Indian Acres.
However, in both Pearson and Indian Acres, the premises were
undergoing structural changes at the time of the injuries. There is
certainly the suggestion in Indian Acres that the fact of structural
changes impacts upon the issue of the possessor's liability. 115
Structural changes also were involved in Krauth v. Geller, 'e the
New Jersey case involving premises undergoing construction. Non-
liability of the possessor in that case was based in part upon the
circumstances of construction."'
A variety of factors influence the determination of the appropri-
ate rule of liability for a possessor to public officials. In addition to
the entrant's classification and public policy considerations, other
important factors include the foreseeability of the entrant's pres-
ence, the entrant's knowledge or reason to know of hazards on the
premises, and the opportunity of the possessor or his agent to warn
the entrant of hazards on the premises. In Meiers v. Fred Koch
Brewery,"' the possessor was on notice that firemen might be on
the premises after business hours because of previous fires. The
court's imposition of liability was based in part on this notice." 9
And in Krauth, the possessor's nonliability was based in part on
the fireman's knowledge that the premises were under
construction. 20
Both of these elements were present in Pearson. The posses-
sor(s) were on notice of the premises condition and the likelihood
that firemen would be upon the premises. However, the plaintiff
fireman knew that the premises were being demolished because of
his previous visits there.'2'
The rule suggested herein for the liability pf possessors to public
officials is based on case precedent and a balancing of the rights
115. Id. at 847, 213 S.E.2d at 797.
116. 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 66-106.
117. Id. at -, 157 A.2d at 131-32. The other predicates of liability were the fireman's
knowledge of the construction and the possessor's absence from the premises. Id. See supra
text accompanying notes 83-87.
118. 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920). See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
119. Id. at -, 127 N.E. at 493.
120. 31 N.J. at -, 157 A.2d at 132.
121. Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., LE-608 (Cir. Ct., City of Richmond, Div. I filed
Apr. 15, 1981). Since Pearson has not been tried, no determination has been made about
whether the contractor or subcontractor or both were actually in possession of the premises
at the time of the injury. See supra note 6. There was no allegation that either the defen-
dants or their agents were present when the injury occurred.
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and burdens of possessors and public officials. The Virginia Su-
preme Court has recognized the liability of a possessor toward a
licensee, premised on The Restatement (Second) of Torts.122 The
Restatement states the liability toward the public official to be
that of a licensee, unless the part of the premises in question is
open to the public.12 3 Furthermore, the supreme court has also in-
dicated that a possessor is not liable to an invitee, to whom the
highest duty is owed, for the accumulation of excess construction
materials during the process of construction. 124
While the possessor does owe a duty to an entrant lawfully upon
his premises, this duty is circumscribed when the entrant is a pub-
lic official in the sui generis category. Although this limitation is
based in part upon the assumption of risks inherent in the occupa-
tion, it is unjust and contrary to public policy to make the fireman
or policeman assume the risk of hazards which are hidden and not
to be anticipated by his training and experience when the posses-
sor has knowledge of the risk and a reasonable opportunity to
warn. Thus, the possessor should be liable to the public official
where these three elements exist: 1) noninherent or undue risks, 2)
possessor knowledge of such risks, and 3) possessor opportunity to
warn of these risks. However, if the premises are undergoing demo-
lition or construction, and such activity is known by the entrant, or
should be known to him in the exercise of reasonable care, it is an
unreasonable and unrealistic burden on the possessor to expect
him to keep those premises in a safe condition at all times.
Based on these considerations and Virginia precedent, the pos-
sessor, should be subject to the following liability:
A possessor of premises is subject to liability for bodily harm
caused by a natural or artificial condition thereon to others who are
privileged to enter upon the premises for a public purpose without
the consent of the possessor, if the possessor
(a) knows that they are upon the premises or are likely to
enter upon it in the exercise of their privilege, and
(b) knows of the condition and should realize that it involves
unreasonable risk to them, and
(c) should have expected that they would not discover or re-
alize the risk, and
122. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11.
123. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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(d) fails to exercise reasonable care to
(i) make the condition reasonably safe or
(ii) warn them of the condition and risk involved.
However, if the bodily harm results from conditions on the prem-
ises involving construction or demolition activities, and if persons
privileged to enter upon the premises for a public purpose know, or
in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that such activities
are being conducted thereon, then the possessor is not liable, unless
the possessor
(i) has actual notice of the premises condition which caused the
bodily injury, and
(ii) has actual knowledge of the presence on the premises of per-
sons so privileged, and
(iii) having obtained such notice and knowledge, fails to use rea-
sonable care to warn the persons so privileged. 25
V. CONCLUSION
Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co. 12 6 presented a unique fac-
tual situation in the field of premises liability in Virginia. It re-
quired the development of a rule of liability of possessors to public
officials who enter premises by legal privilege, irrespective of the
possessor's consent or invitation. Because premises undergoing
construction or demolition present special circumstances and often
provide external notice to the entrant, an exception to the general
rule of liability was established. The rule and the exception result
in a balance between the appropriate rights and burdens of posses-
sors of premises and those public officials entering for a public
duty pursuant to a legal privilege.
125. This rule is expressly applicable only to the liability of the possessor of premises to
public officials who enter thereon lawfully and in the performance of a public duty, without
the express invitation or consent of the possessor. Neither assumption of the risk nor con-
tributory negligence is affected by this rule.
This rule is not expressly applicable to building inspectors who are on the premises dur-
ing construction or demolition activities carrying out a public duty to inspect the property.
Their visits are usually not unexpected and occur during "normal business hours." These
individuals are often classified as invitees with corresponding duties owed. See, e.g., Atkins
v. Urban Redev. Auth., 263 Pa. Super. 37, -, 396 A.2d 1364, 1369-70 (1979) (impliedly invi-
tee; recovery barred by contributory negligence), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part on
other grounds, 489 Pa. 356, 414 A.2d 100 (1980); PROSSER, supra note 42, § 61, at 396. Nor
does this rule affect the possessor's liability to members of the general public who are in-
jured near a construction or demolition site because the possessor has failed to comply with
governmental ordinances or otherwise to exercise reasonable care.
126. LE-608 (Cir. Ct., City of Richmond, Div. I filed Apr. 15, 1981).
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